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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW JURISPRUDENTIAL
LECTURE SERIES*
"PROPERTY RIGHTS" IN CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS TODAY
James L. Oakes**
Yesterday the active area in this field was concerned with "property." Today it is "civil liberties." Tomorrow it may again be
"property." Who can say that in a society with a mixed economy,
like ours, these two areas are sharply separated, and that certain
freedoms in relation to property may not again be deemed, as they
were in the past, aspects of individualfreedom?
Justice Felix Frankfurter)
The concept of "property rights" in Supreme Court constitutional
analysis today is in flux. It has been and is undergoing change-a change
more rapid than those of us who have concentrated our attention on other
personal rights can imagine. That this process of change raises anew
some fundamental issues of justice is not surprising; the institution of
property has always done so.
Perhaps the change is simply a swing of the pendulum, as the quote
from Justice Frankfurter suggests: individual "property rights" assume
greater importance as a state moves toward a laissez-faire economy or
away from a regulated one; they tend to have less significance when the
state takes on a welfare cast. Perhaps change in viewing "property
rights" under the Constitution is inevitable since the very philosophical
concepts underlying "property rights," if they are not mutually conflicting, at least constitute a spectrum of relationships between the individual
and the state which secures those rights. This spectrum inevitably reflects
political ebb and flow.

The Washington Law Review Lecture Series, now in its eighth year, is designed to bring outstanding speakers to the Law School to discuss contemporary legal issues. The Review gratefully
acknowledges the generous financial assistance provided by the Evans Bunker Memorial Fund.
** Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; A.B., 1945, L.L.B.,
1947, Harvard University.
1. OFLAWANDMEN 19 (1956).
*
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MADISON AND JEFFERSON: THE SPECTRUM OF MODELS
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
Madison and the Dominion View
The views of Madison and Jefferson reflect the contrasting ends of this
spectrum. Madison, in 1787, recommended a property qualification for
electors of the House of Representatives. 2 While he was to modify this
view over three decades later, he nevertheless maintained the basic capitalistic view of property rights, a view derived from Locke 3 and Blackstone. 4 Madison wrote in 182 1:
In civilized communities, property as well as personal rights is an
essential object of the laws, which encourage industry by securing
the enjoyment of its fruits: that industry from which property results,
& that enjoyment which consists not merely in its immediate use,
but in its post-humous destination to objects of choice and of kindred
affection.
In a just & a free, Government, therefore, the rights both of prop5
erty & of persons ought to be effectually guarded.
In the conception of John Locke, property was an attribute of a man's
personality that was instrumental in giving him a political character. It
was that estate or substance which a person possesses exclusive of the
right of others. 6 Property thus was dominion, it was an absolute, it was to
be treated no differently from, and with at least as much respect as, other
rights.
This view is reflected by the fact that property was mentioned with
other personal rights in, for example, the Virginia Bill of Rights, 7 the

2.

Speech before the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 7. 1787). reprinted in 2 THE RECORDS OF

THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 203 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
3. See J. LOCKE. The Second Treatise of Government ch. 5, in TN o TREATISES OF GoN ERNMENT

(London 1698). This simplistic view does not, of course. take into account. itter alia. gains reflecting values wholly socially created by expenditure. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York. 42
N.Y.2d 324. 328. 397 N.Y.S.2d 914. 916 (1977). aff'd. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). or by tax exemption
or other subsidy.
4. See I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 139.
5. Note on Madison's Speech of Aug. 7, 1787 (ca. 1821). reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOuN
DER 503 (M. Meyers ed. 1973).
6. J. LOCKE, supra note 3: see G. WOOD, THE CREATION OFTHE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787.
at 219 (1969). Locke, of course. conceived of the earth and its contents as given by God to men in
common, but as appropriated by labor to individuals. J. LOCKE. supra note 3, §§ 27-30.
7
VA. CONST. arts. 1, 6. 1.

Property Rights
Massachusetts Bill of Rights, 8 and the Northwest Ordinance. 9 This
grouping is consistent with the view that rights concerning property are
themselves rights of persons. As Learned Hand, the former great Chief
Judge of my court, remarked in his essay on ChiefJustice Stone's Concept of the Judicial Function, "Just why property itself was not a 'personal right' nobody took the time to explain ....,10 Itis not a little ironic

that it had been Justice Stone's famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co. 11that set the stage for a constitutional double standard
between economic rights and personal rights. 12 Even so, the right to
"property" was recognized at the very time to which Hand's remark was
directed as one of several personal rights. The right to "property" was
even said to be "fundamental" in Justice Jackson's monumental opinion
in 1943 on religious freedom, West Virginia State Board of Education v.
13
Barnette.
While "property" is not mentioned specifically in the Constitution
proper, it is of course in the fifth and fourteenth amendments, and one
property right is referred to in the "obligation of contracts" clause in
8. MASS. CONsT. art. 1.
9. Ordinance of July 13, 1787, art. 2, reprintedin DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 130-31
(8th ed. H. Commager 1968). The Northwest Ordinance went one step further. It recognized that
protection of property rights required that laws should not "interfere with or affect private contracts
or engagements, bonafide, and without fraud, previously formed," id. at 131, thereby establishing a
basis for the concept later called "freedom of contract."
10. Hand, ChiefJustice Stone's Conception of the JudicialFunction, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 696,
698(1946).
11. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Dean Wellington points out correctly that footnote four is an
explanation of, not a justification for, a constitutional double standard. Wellington, Common Law
Rules andConstitutionalDouble Standards:Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 278-79
(1973). But the CaroleneProductsfootnote is often thought of as having created the double standard.
Perhaps it would be as well to say it simply recognized the double standard. See Lusky, Minority
Rights and the PublicInterest, 52 YALE L.J. 1,20-21 (1942); note 56 infra.
12. See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34, 36. But see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 56 (Supp.
1979) ("[T]here can be no bright line between 'economic rights' and 'personal rights'.").
13. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). According to Justice Jackson's classic statement:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may
not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
Id. at 638.
It is ironic that Chief Judge Hand made his remark, quoted in text, probably with an eye towards
Barnette, because Justice Frankfurter's dissent in that case took the majority to task for its loose
approach to the due process clause and its lack of judicial restraint. Id. at 647-49, 666. Hand was to
refer in his essay on Stone to the fact that "when 'personal rights' were in issue, something strangely
akin to the discredited attitude towards the Bill of Rights of the old apostles of the institution of
property, was regaining recognition." Hand, supranote 10, at 698.
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5
article I, section 10. 14 The historical basis of property rights is clear. 1
More recently, after lower federal courts had wrestled, rather unsuccessfully I fear,16 with the dilemma posed in Judge Hand's statement, Justice
Stewart, in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 17 sought to lay to rest the
"false" dichotomy between "personal liberties" and "property rights":
"Property does not have rights. People have rights .... In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and
the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the
other. That rights in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized." 18

Jefferson and the Social View
Contrast this view, and Madison's statements concerning the basis of
property rights, with the social view held by Jefferson. In a letter to Madison from Fontainbleau in 1785, after reflecting that the property of preRevolutionary France was "absolutely concentrated in a very few hands"
with the poor unable to work and the lands kept idle mostly for game,
Jefferson wrote:
I am conscious that an equal division of property is impracticable.
But the consequences of this enormous inequality producing so
much misery to the bulk of mankind, legislators cannot invent too
many devices for subdividing property, only taking care to let their
subdivisions go hand in hand with the natural affections of the
human mind. The descent of property of every kind therefore to all
the children, or to all the brothers and sisters, or other relations in
equal degree is a politic measure, and a practicable one. Another
means of silently lessening the inequality of property is to exempt all
from taxation below a certain point, and to tax the higher portions of
property in geometrical progression as they rise. Whenever there is
in any country, uncultivated lands and unemployed poor. it is clear
14. "No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder. ex post facto Law. or Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts ..
." U.S. CONST. art 1, § 10, cf. 1.
15.

See Corwin, Introduction to THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA at

xxviii-xxxi (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1973). See also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946):
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint. 275
U.S. 303 (1927).
16. See, e.g., Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 564-66 (2d Cir. 1969). cert. denied. 400 U.S.
841 (1970) (holding that enactment of rent control act does not give rise to jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3). relying upon Stone's formulation in Hague v. C.I.O.. 307 U.S. 496. 518. 531
(1939), applying the jurisdictional statute "whenever the right or immunity is one of personal liberty.
not dependent for its existence upon the infringement of property rights").
17.

405 U.S. 538 (1972).

18.

Id. at 552.
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that the laws of property have been so far extended as to violate natural right. The earth is given as a common stock for man to labour and
live on. 19
Thus viewed, property-'"given as a common stock for man"-is subject to regulation for the benefit of persons, to progressive taxation, and to
certain higher rights in the public at large. Property is, so to speak, held in
trust by a person not just for his own benefit but for the benefit of others
and of the state. Property rights are viewed not in the abstract but as significantly determined by what Frank Michelman has called "existing conditions of economic resource employment within [the rights-holder's] so-

cial universe.'

'20

Put another way, one view of "property" emphasizes the concept that
we are independent individuals; the other emphasizes that we are also
parts of a social whole. 2 1 Obviously, under the former, or "dominion,"
view of property, the legal system will tolerate a lesser degree of interference from the state by way of taxation or regulation than would be the
case under the latter, or "social" view of property. Most judges, including those on the Supreme Court, with which this article deals, commence
analysis with both views as part of their value apparatus.
These ambivalent, often opposing, views of property have been present
throughout our political, economic, social and, therefore, legal or constitutional history. Perceiving them as distinct analytical tools, sometimes
intertwining, sometimes contrary, often conflicting, gives insight, I believe, into some of the knottier problems of our constitutional thinking of
the past, and hence to a clearer concept of the present, if not the future.

19: Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), reprintedin THE PORTABLE
THOMAS JEFFERSON 395, 396-97 (M. Peterson ed. 1975). Jefferson's view doubtless had input from
Rousseau, who had observed the same scene a few years previously. See 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 214-20 (1972 ed.). See generally L. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS ch. 8 (1977).
20. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:Comments on the EthicalFoundationsof "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1167 (1967).
21. See also B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977). Ackerman looks
principally towards two philosophic justifications-he calls them "Comprehensive Views'--the
Utilitarian, id. ch. 3, and the Kantian, id. ch. 4, and contrasts the perspectives of the Scientific
Policymaker, who looks to these two normative theories, with the perspective of the Ordinary Observer, who looks to Layman's Things in a simplistic way. Ackerman's concentration on the importance of philosophic theory is criticized in Soper, On the Relevance of Philosophy to Law: Reflections
on Ackerman's PrivatePropertyand the Constitution, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 44 (1979), as not deciding
hard cases, even though Professor Soper also sees Utilitarianism as emphasizing our membership in
society and Kantianism our individuality. Id. at 64.
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PREMISES-MORE VARIATIONS ON THE THEME OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS
So stated, our analysis requires temporary digression from these mat22
ters which have intrigued philosophers from Aristotle to the present.
We must agree upon a language, 2 3 or at least a few semantic premises,
unless we are to be, in Professor Ackerman's terms. "mere 'Ordinary
Observers' without any semblance of 'Scientific Policymaking. "'
First, we must recognize that the term "property rights" is used in two
different senses, often interchangeably. One sense in which we use property rights is generic. It refers not just to land or to possessions or things,
but includes what might best be termed "economic rights." In this sense,
then, the term "property rights" encompasses not only rights to land, to
possessions, and to things, but to incorporeal "entitlements"; it includes
stock ownership, the so-called "new property," 24 and it includes, from a
constitutional point of view, the right to make contracts in reference to
property. Its use inevitably raises questions not only of "substantive due
process," but also questions of the construction of forbidding the states
from impairing the obligation of contracts. Each of these two methods of
constitutionally analyzing questions of property rights has, in its time,
been declared a dead letter. One purpose of this paper will be to examine
the status today of substantive due process and the contract clause in Supreme Court analysis.
The other meaning of property rights is more particular, a special legal
language used by property lawyers, sometimes even by judges, certainly
by commentators, principally in the field of "takings" or "just compensation" law. This field of law has taken on an entirely new dimension in
this era of land-use and environmental controls brought about by increased public awareness of the finite quality of many, perhaps all, resources. In this language, familiar to most I am sure, one must discard
"ownership" or "the owner" as insufficient abstractions and speak
22.

See. e.g.. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 21: L. BECKER, supra note 19; Berger. The Accommo-

dation Power in Land Use Controversies:A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 799
(1976): Costonis. "'Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking
Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Costonis.
"Fair" Compensation); Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal

Decision. 91 HARV. L. REV. 402 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Costonis. The DisparityIssuel: Michelman, supra note 20, at 1202-27; Sax, Takings and the Police Power. 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Sax 11 Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights. 81 YALE L.J. 149
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Sax II]: Stoebuck. Police Power, Takings, and Due Process.37 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1057 (1980).

23.
24.

See Snare, The Concept ofProperty. 9 AM. PHILOSOPHY Q. 200 (1972).
See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-9 (1978); Reich. Tie New Property. 73

YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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rather of relationships among persons with respect to things. "Property,"
25
in this sense, is a set of legal relations, and includes the following:
1) the right of a person to possess the thing or, in the case of incorporeal things, to exclude others from possessing it;
2) the right to use the thing;
3) the right to manage the thing;
4) the right to the income orprofitsfrom use of the thing;
5) the right to the capital in the thing, i.e., the power to consume,
waste, modify, sell or alienate, or even destroy it;
6) the immunity from expropriation of the thing by another or the
state; and
7) the power to transmitthe thing by gift, bequest, or devise.
But this does not end the bundle of rights or relationships, for there are
or may be at least four limitations upon them, including:
1) the term of tenure, which in a universe of human beings is, at
least in most cases, life, except as modified by the power to transmit;
2) a duty not to use the thing so as to harm others;
3) a liability to execution on the thing, e.g., for debts; and
4) a liability to reverter or abandonment of the thing. There may
be other limitations on individual rights in the bundle, e.g., against
perpetuities in the case of the right to transmit or for taxation in the
case of income or alienation.
Thus property rights are, as Professor Lawrence Becker has said, "typ26
ically aggregates of different sorts of rights and rights-correlatives,"
that is, sets of rights. And property law is, or should be, an examination
and resolution of the conflicts between or among the different holders of
the sets of rights. Constitutional analysis of property rights in his sense
involved an examination of when the Constitution, through the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, either precludes a reassignment of one or more
of those rights from one person's bundle to another's ("due process
law") or requires in connection with reassignment of one or more of
those rights to the state the payment of "just compensation" ("taking
law"). This may include the further examination, as that fifth amendment

25. This analysis is essentially based upon A. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS INJURISPRUDFNCE 107-47 (A. Guest ed. 1961). See also IntroductoryNote to RESTATEMENTOF PROPERTY
ch. 1 (1936); L. BECKER, supra note 19, at 18-19; Michelman, supra note 20, at 1185 n.41. Plainly,
"ownership" does not always imply the same set of sticks in the bundle of rights.
26. L. BECKER, supranote 19, at21.
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clause implies, of what is "just" or what will serve the purposes of jus27

tice.
And to complicate matters somewhat further, property lawyers have

for centuries been able to devise permutations and combinations of the
foregoing bundle of rights and qualifications which even as above mentioned come to 2047 in number, 28 but when added to by the medieval
lawyers' Rule in Shelley's Case, or springing and shifting uses, or today's land-use technicians' transferable development rights, 29 become almost infinite in number.
THE SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
The ContractClause

Using property rights in the generic sense, the history of constitutional
treatment before the 1970's may be divided into three very broad phases.
The first, exemplified by the cases of Dartmouth College v. Woodward3°
and Fletcher v. Peck, 31 was the contract clause 32 phase, in which obligations in state charters and private agreements were protected from impairment by state legislation. During this era, commencing with Fletcher v.
Peck and ending in 1887 with Seibert v. UnitedStates ex rel. Lewis, 33 the
Court invalidated state legislation, much of it pro-debtor legislation, 34 on
the basis of the contract clause. 35 This phase of American constitutional

law saw the American corporation arise; corporate property rights were
27. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at 28-29: Costonis, "Fair" Compensation, supra note
22, at 1038-45: Michelman, supra note 20, at 1168-69. Norman Williams has pointed out to me
that a substantial body of state case law deals with the rights neighbors have to prevent zoning relaxation. Land use regulation plainly may fall into either due process or taking law categories: at least the
transfers it causes are not always to the government. See Stoebuck. supra note 22. at 1092.
28. L. BECKER, supra note 19. at 21.
29. See Berger, supra note 22, at 802; Costonis, "Fair" Compensation. supra note 22. at
1061-70. See also 3 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW § 71 A. I I (Cum. Supp. 1980).
30. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (New Hampshire could not change private college into public
institution in violation of 1769 charter from George III).
31.
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (contract clause prevented Georgia from annulling land titles
vested in good faith purchasers from state's original grantees).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 10, cf. 1.I am informed by Norman Williams that Professor Fuller of
Columbia used to refer to the contract clause as a "buzz saw which has some very unusual characteristics-it is very sharp. it is invisible, and it is ambulatory, so that you never can tell when it is going
to come by and take your finger off."
33. 122 U.S. 284 (1887) (law, requiring petitions before taxes could be levied to amortize previously issued bonds, held invalid).
34. E.g., Walker v. Whitehead, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 314 (1872) (law restricting remedies for
obtaining judgment held invalid as to prior contracts),
35. According to Bernard Schwartz, in the Chase and Waite Courts alone there were 49 cases in
which state laws were invalidated under the contract clause. Schwartz, Old Wine in Old Bottles? The
Renaissance of the Contract Clause, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 95, 98.
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protected and corporations flourished. 36 Even after Seibert, the Court
continued to rely on the contract clause from time to time, in a dozen or
so cases, until Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell.37 The

Court there upheld Minnesota's depression-engendered mortgage moratorium law by reading into contracts "the reservation of essential attributes
of sovereign power.

. .

as a postulate of the legal order."3 Plainly, if

that reservation is always read into contracts, the contract clause has little
if any meaning. It became in this understanding simply superfluous.
Substantive Due Process

The second phase of property rights treatment, overlapping somewhat
with the first, was that of substantive due process. It commenced with
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway v. Minnesota,39 where the Court

subjected railroad rate regulation to judicial review for reasonableness,
and reached its zenith-or nadir-in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,40 Lochner v.
New York, 41 and Coppage v. Kansas.42

Substantive due process rested on the fourteenth and fifth amendments;
as in the case of the contract clause, property rights were protected
36. Id. at 97.
37. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
38. Id. at 435. Analogously, under the theory of Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), and
progeny, "the institution of private property ownership is generally viewed as being necessarily subject to the implied condition that the state, through exercise of its police power, may impose appropriate regulations to ensure that such property will not be used in a way that unreasonably causes injury
to others." Van Alstyne, Taking or Damagingby Police Power:The Searchfor Inverse Condemnation Criteria,44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 5 (1971). See also Stoebuck, supra note 22, at 1069 ("[under
one line of cases] no exercise of the police power is a taking; police power is one thing, eminent
domain another").
39. 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
40. 165 U.S. 578 (1897). The "liberty of contract" era really commenced with Allgeyer, in
which the Supreme Court unanimously held that a Louisiana statute prohibiting effectuation of mafine insurance contracts in Louisiana with companies not licensed to do business in Louisiana exceeded the state's police power and violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment by
infringing upon liberty of contract. The Court equated liberty of contract with property rights by
stating: "In the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade and of acquiring, holding and sell"Id. at
ing property must be embraced the right to make all proper contracts in relation thereto ..
591. This statement relied in large part upon a similar proposition adopted by the first Justice Harlan
in Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678,684 (1888).
41. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The era of substantive due process is best known by the decision in
Lochner, which invalidated a New York statute limiting bakery employees' hours to 60 per week,
and 10 per day. The Court in Lochner rejected New York's claim that the statute was significantly
and directly related to the promotion of employee health.
Anti-Lochner literature is enormous, with one of my favorites being Felix Frankfurter's first signed
law review article, Hours of Labor and Realism in ConstitutionalLaw, 29 HARV. L. REV. 353
(1916).
42. 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (Kansas law proscribing "yellow dog" contracts deprived employers of
liberty of contract).
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against substantive legislation detrimentally affecting those rights. Appealing to higher law, the Court harked back to Locke's dictum that "the
supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without
his own consent," 43 a passage clearly reflecting the dominion view of
property. This was done, however, in the name of "liberty"-freedom
of contract-which is one of the sticks in the bundle of property rights to
which we have previously referred, as was recognized by the Court in
44
Allgever.
So too there was conceived an interrelationship, an equation, between
the due process clause and the takings clause. Justice Harlan wrote in
Smyth v. Ames, 45 "the question whether [rates] are so unreasonably low
as to deprive the carrier of its property without such compensation as the
Constitution secures, and therefore without due process of law [is a matter for judicial review]." William Stoebuck has perceptively pointed out
that "[c]onfusion over the proper role of substantive due process and over
the relationship between due process and takings is a pervasive problem
in judicial decisions and in scholarly writing." 46 Perhaps much confusion
could be eliminated by following his analysis of first examining whether a
governmental regulation is void on due process grounds as unreasonable,
unduly oppressive or arbitrary and capricious, and only then examining
whether there has been a taking or confiscation. But by virtue of the fact
that in some police power cases a given exercise of that power may be
thought to be both unreasonable and to constitute a taking. substantive
due process and takings law frequently have had an overlapping, if not
equivalent content. The former has been applied principally to invalidate
governmental regulation of business, working conditions, and the like,
the latter, as we shall see, to invalidate governmental redistribution of
rights from one aggregate holder to another.
In any event, the established doctrine has been that substantive due
process came to a dead end with the New Deal Court, commencing with

43. J, LOCKV, supra note 3, § 138.
44.
165 U.S. at 591. See note 40supra.
45.
169 U.S. 466,526 (1898).
46. Stoebuck. supra note 22, at 1081. Professor Stoebuck views substantive due process as involving, under Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894), a three prong test: I) whether the interests of the public require the police power exercise: 2) whether the means are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose: and 3) whether the means are -unduly oppressive" on the

individuals. So limited, substantive due process may not be the evil creature many of us have been
trained to think it is: rather it involves merely a "public purpose" examination, followed by classic
means-end analysis. This lends support to Professor Tribe's view that Lochner's true error was not in
terms of the Court's intervening to protect liberty (or property in the name of liberty) but in not
understanding the requirements of liberty in an industrialized age. See notes 54 & 55 and accompanying text infra.
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West CoastHotel Co. v. Parrish.47 The Court reverted to the thinking of
Munn v. Illinois,48 the rate regulation decision, the revolutionary nature
of which helped to precipitate its converse, the constitutional adoption of
the doctrine of laissez faire. 49 West CoastHotel re-established that courts
do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of
legislative bodies. 50 After West Coast Hotel, the law schools, the lower
courts, and the commentators treated freedom of contract certainly, and
substantive due process with it, as unsound constitutional doctrine and as,
for all practical purposes, dead law.
There is, of course, hard truth in this assessment. Lochner and friends
did involve unwarranted judicial fact-finding. 5 1 Implicit in this was a second-guessing of the legislature as to its purpose in enacting the law. This
second-guessing was doubtless undemocratic in addition to being unresponsive to the needs of an industrial society. As Justice Holmes said in
his Lochner dissent, the fourteenth amendment did "not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." 52 The economic realities of the Great Depression, the whole movement towards legal realism and away from natural rights and common law theory, and internal Supreme Court doctrinal
change, among other things, culminated in abandonment of Lochner-type
adjudications. 53 Judging Lochner solely in institutional terms, as Professor Laurence Tribe has persuasively pointed out, 54 the doctrine exempli47. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). By 1949 the Court expressly repudiated the "Allgeyer-Lochner-AdairCoppage constitutional doctrine." Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335
U.S. 525, 535 (1949). But Robert Stevens reminds me that Alexander Bickel saw Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as a return to substantive due process.
48. 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (upholding Illinois' regulation of grain elevator charges, as affecting
"the public interest"). Munn is, of course, the foundation of 100 years of regulation in the "public
interest," or what has been supposed as such.
49. See Corwin, supra note 15, at xxx. B. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITTION (1942),
which has the subtitle "How Laissez Faire Came to the Supreme Court," discusses the reaction of
the business-legal establishment to Munn v. Illinois, culminating in Allgeyer, Lochner, et al. History
continues to repeat itself.
50. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876). See also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,
537, 538 (1934), quoted in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397-98 (1937).
51. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64: "[T]he limitation of the hours of labor . . . has no such
direct relation to, and no such substantial effect upon, the health of the employee, as to justify us in
regarding the section as really health law."
52. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). In answer to a latter-day Lochner-type argument, the
author was to borrow from Holmes by saying, "the Equal Protection Clause of the same amendment
did not enact Professor Milton Friedman's economics of the marketplace." Image Carrier Corp. v.
Beame, 567 F.2d 1197, 1202-03 (2d Cir. 1977) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 979
(1979).
53. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding maximum working hours provisions for women). See also U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI, overruling the result reached in Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
54. L. TRIBE, supranote 24, § 8-7.
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fled by that case was discredited, as was the doctrine of judicial review
generally. But it may be that the true error in decisions like Lochner, as
Tribe suggests, lies in the fact that the Court had intervened to protect
liberty (or property in the name of liberty) "in a misguided understanding
of what liberty actually required in the industrial age." 55 If we look only
to the classical means-end analysis used by the Court in Lochner, substantive due process may not be the evil we have all supposed.
Phase Three: The Segregation of Property and Civil Rights
The third phase of property rights was recognized in footnote four of
United States v. Carolene Products Co. 56 The Court there observed that
giving legislatures totally free sway in the economic area was to permit
them free sway in other areas as well, and that this could not be done in a
system of justice for all. The footnote suggested a "narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality" when courts are determining the validity of "statutes directed at particular religious . . . or
national . . . or racial minorities. "57 This is because "prejudice against

discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.'"58 As Dean Sandalow was to say,
"[f]orty years later, that cautious suggestion has ripened into an attitude. 59 What we have had since CaroleneProducts, the third phase of
property rights, is a judicial double standard, with the courts feeling more
free to protect the civil rights other than property rights of minorities,
political and otherwise, even while there has been great restraint upon
protection of property rights in the broad sense.
Under this double standard there has in fact been a succession of cases
in which the Supreme Court has reviewed, under the due process clause,
the substantive validity of state and federal laws as they pertain to rights
other than those of property and found them wanting. For example, in
Skinner v. Oklahoma6o the Court held that a state cannot sterilize repeated
55.

Id. § 1I-1, at 564. See id. §§ 8-6, 8-7.

56.

304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For an interesting article mentioning the vast literature sur-

rounding this footnote, see Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1162
(1977). See also note II supra.
57. CaroleneProducts, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
58. Id.
59. Sandalow, supra note 56, at 1162. Sandalow goes on to say that the footnote has been read

"as an open-ended invitation to extend similar protection to an ill-defined assortment of groups that
have failed to attain their objectives through the political process.'" Id. But see N. DORSEN. THE
RIGHTS oF AMERICANS ( 1971).
60. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).

Property Rights
larcenists while merely imprisoning repeated embezzlers; in Robinson v.
California6 1 that a state cannot make narcotics addiction a crime; in
Griswold v. Connecticut62 that a state cannot punish a married couple's
use of contraceptives; in Roe v. Wade63 that a state cannot proscribe procuring the abortion of a human fetus except when necessary to save the
life of the mother.
However, if the same institutional standards that put economic matters
beyond judicial competence are applied to the decisions invalidating legislation regulating civil rights other than those pertaining to property,
must not those decisions-Brown v. Board of Education64 perhaps foremost among them-be judged to have exceeded judicial competence?
Are they not an undemocratic usurpation of government power by the
judiciary, irrespective of the clause in the fourteenth amendment to which
the given case refers? 65 This implies one of two conclusions. The first is
that there is a double standard for property rights in the generic sense on
the one hand and other civil rights on the other-but we have already
seen, or have we, that since Lynch there should no longer be any such
double standard. The alternative, if we are to believe that Brown was
sound, is that our application of the institutional standards of judicial
competency to Lochner and friends has been wrong. Perhaps this dilemma does not admit of any clear-cut resolution. But to confront it directly gives us insight into the status of property rights in constitutional
analysis and the judicial process today. 66 Can it be that Lochner quite
61. 370 U.S. 660(1962).
62. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Of course, other clauses of the Constitution were used in the Court's
analysis.
63. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Here too other clauses were used in the opinion of the Court but at least
one Justice acknowledged that substantive due process was the key. See id. at 170 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
64. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see generally R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
65. Substantive due process and "strict scrutiny" under the equal protection clause often overlap. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't of
Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973). Indeed, equal protection arguments can be made in terms of
economic rights. See, e.g., Dieffenbach v. Attorney Gen., 604 F.2d 187, 195-98 (2d Cir. 1979);
Image Carrier Corp. v. Beame, 567 F.2d 1197, 1202-03 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 979
(1979).
Purporting to argue from history, Raoul Berger is in the forefront of the institutional-standards
criticism of Brown and, I take it, the entire expansion of civil liberties in the last 25 years. See his
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977), subtitled "The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment,"
and especially pages 269-82. For a criticism of Berger's arguments, see Soifer, Protecting Civil
Rights: A Critiqueof Raoul Berger'sHistory, 54 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 651 (1979). And yet, even Archibald Cox has said in THE ROLE OFTHE SUPREME COURT INAMERICAN GOVERNMENT 50 (1976) that, in
reference to free speech decisions, "the Warren Court behaved even more like a Council of Wise
Men and less like a court than the laissez-faireJustices."
66. See Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of Rights, 54
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 911,923-24 (1979) (footnotes omitted):
While the ghost of Lochner v. New York probably has been laid to rest, we recognize certain
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correctly and properly used a rational means-end test in examining challenged legislation 67-a test which has been subsumed in modem equal
protection analysis? 68 Can it be that what was wrong with Lochner was
not that it examined legislation substantively but that it overly limited the
legitimate ends that government might have so as to accord with laissezfaire philosophy and economics of the day (including redistribution of
69
wealth), or that it did not correctly read the underlying legislative facts?
Or is the dilemma one essentially caused by the underlying dualistic view
of property rights that we have previously discussed-as being social or
common-held in trust on the one hand and pertaining to individuals as a
part of their dominion on the other? This view translates itself readily into
a correlative right-duty analysis, finding a short-hand phrase on the other
side of the liberty-property coin in Chief Justice Jay's first charge to a
grand jury as a federal judge, while sitting in the Eastern Circuit:
[Clivil liberty consists not in a right to every man to do just what he
pleases, but it consists in an equal right to all the citizens to have,
enjoy, and to do, in peace security and without molestation, whatever the equal and constitutional laws of the country admit to be con70
sistant [sic] with the public good.
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The decade just past has seen a series of decisions by the Supreme
fundamental personal interests with substantive content, which are subject to treatment under the
equal protection clause, with its emphasis on the equal citizenship values of respect, participation. and responsibility, as well as under the due process clause-, viewed as a provision protecting individual "personhood" and the coordinate interests in being free from governmental intrusion. in "avoiding disclosure of personal matters," and in preserving "independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions." There are, in short, both "liberty" and "entitlement"
interests that have substantive content and are not subject to governmental deprivation: and to
hold this view is not inconsistent with holding a latitudinarian view as to the powers of government with respect to economic matters, at least where there is some rational relationship to a
legitimate governmental objective.
67. The Court in Lochner stated:
The mere assertion that the subject relates, though but in a remote degree, to the public health,
does not necessarily render the enactment valid. The act must have a more direct relation, as a
means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held
to be valid which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his person and in
his power to contract in relation to his own labor.
198 U.S. at 57-58.
68. See Gunther. The Supreme Court, 1971 Termn-Forei'ord:It Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court:A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I (1972).
69. See L. TRIBE, supra note 24, § 8-3.
70. Charge to Grand Juries on Eastern Circuit, (Apr. 4. 1790-May 20, 1790) (Document in
Papers of John Jay in the Columbia University Library). I am indebted to Columbia University's
Richard Morris, historian and collector of the Papers of John Jay. for this reference.
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Court suggesting that we are entering a fourth phase, in which substantive
constitutional content will once again be given to property rights, some
would say restoring property rights to their "rightful place." I have
already mentioned the opinion in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,7
treating-properly I think-property rights as personal rights.
Accompanying Lynch, and with some shuffling back and forth, a series
of other decisions in the 1970's recognized persons having property rights
as entitled to minimal requirements of procedural regularity despite contrary state law. Fuentes v. Shevin 72 required notice and hearing before
prejudgment replevin despite state law, in effect when the conditional
sales contract was signed, permitting ex parte prejudgment replevin. In
North Georgia Finishing,Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,73 garnishment of a corporate bank account without a probable cause hearing was invalidated despite a contract conditioning the corporation's property interest in the
bank account upon relinquishment of the right to demand such a hearing.
In each of these cases, the Court held that the fact "[t]hat the debtor was
deprived of only the use and possession of the property, and perhaps only
temporarily, did not put the seizure beyond scrutiny under the Due Process Clause." 74 1 will not belabor the other cases recognizing the "new
75
property," which include entitlements to public assistance payments,
driver's licenses, 76 and government employment, 77 because the protec78
tions afforded were procedural-for example, a right to a hearing rather than substantive in nature, though the line is often difficult to
draw. 79 But it is significant that these opinions spoke in terms of property
rights. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 80 Justice Stewart's majority opinion
defined property interests as being "created and

. . .

defined by existing

rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as
71. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
72. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). But see Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (upholding
Louisiana sequestration statute permitting prejudgment seizure of consumer goods without prior notice or hearing).
73. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
74. Id. at 606 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), with approval).
75. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
76. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
77. Compare Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), with Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972). See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974) (plurality opinion,
suggesting that "where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations
on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right," the litigant "must take the
bitter with the sweet").
78. See Friendly, "Some Kind ofHearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975).
79. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972).
80. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976) (sufficiency of
claim of entitlement to continued employment must be decided by reference to state law).
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state law." While speaking only of "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment's
procedural protection of property," it existed as a "safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits.''

81

One immediate question raised, but certainly not answered, 82 by these
decisions involving relations between government and individual is why
there should be a distinction between substantive and procedural protections afforded. This is what the plurality in Arnett v. Kennedy83 addressed
in referring to cases "where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably
intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right." 84 This is the central problem of property rights generally, an unresolved problem which I suggest is inherent
in our dualistic view of property as individual dominion on the one hand
and social commonalty on the other. When is a governmental limitation
on the exercise of a right in respect to "property" beyond governmental
power because there is a residue of personal dominion which the state
cannot touch? When will we view the governmental limitation as within
the reach of governmental power because inherent in the expectations of
the person holding the right(s) is the possibility (or probability, or condition) that government will impose the limitation in question? 85
To resolve this question with a single answer in favor of property as,
speaking generally, the Court did for the better part of 140 years, is to put
property rights beyond legislative reach. Given a failure of the market to
operate freely and fairly, such a resolution invites destruction of the state
by revolution or otherwise. To answer the question generally the other
way to permit governmental regulation, as the Court has done for the last
forty years, is ultimately to make the state all powerful and to deny personal rights-part of freedom-which our government was established
86
to protect.
81.

408 U.S. at 576 (emphasis added).

82. See Van Alstyne. Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977), which suggests that thinking of relationships as
.'property rights" is unsound; instead of "new property." old liberty leads to preferable results.
Professor Tribe appears to agree. L. TRIBE, supranote 24, § 10-12, at 538. But see Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (right of grandparent to have grandchild live in same house is a
"property right").
83. 416 U.S. 134(1974).
84. Id. at 153-54.
85. See HFH. Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508. 521. 542 P,2d 237, 247-48. 125 Cal.
Rptr. 365. (1975). cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976) (land investors know that environmental controls may be imposed at any time). See also note 38 and accompanying text supra.
86. There is obviously no single answer-legal or otherwise-to the problem of governmental
regulation and individual property rights. The case law, which is totally conflicting, provides two
opposing lines of authority, sometimes referring to one clause, sometimes another. As William Stoebuck has pointed out in determining whether there is a police power taking, for example. there are

Property Rights
The ContractClause
As I hope by now is abundantly clear, one aspect of property rights is
the right to contract with others regarding the use of property, 87 a phase of
human activity dealt with in the contract clause. A second signpost of a
new phase of property rights is that the contract clause, after a dormancy
of at least four decades, is no longer a "dead letter," 88 but rather has, in
the words of Bernard Schwartz, had a veritable "renaissance." 8 9 In the
first of two key cases, United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,90 the Supreme Court struck down under the contract clause state laws repealing a
statutory covenant that revenues of the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey would not be used to subsidize mass transit. The Court held
the repeal to have impaired the states' obligation to Port Authority bondholders. And despite the fact that one rationale of United States Trust was
that stricter scrutiny would be given to statutes affecting a state's own
92
contracts, 91 in the second case, Allied StructuralSteel Co. v. Spannaus,
the contract clause was held to have been violated by a statute affecting
only private contractual arrangements, viz., a statute charging employers
who terminate pension plans involving employees of ten years or more
without vested pension rights.
Though the statute invalidated in United States Trust was only arguably
an exercise of the police power by the states, the statute invalidated in
Allied Structural Steel was clearly such an exercise. No longer under the
contract clause is there to be total judicial deference to economic and social legislation affecting property rights. Justice Brennan, in dissent in
United States Trust, said: "[T]oday's case signals a return to substantive
constitutional review of States' policies, and a new resolve to protect
property owners whose interest or circumstances may happen to appeal to

"two basic contending doctrines'--that "no exercise of the police power is a taking" (Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)) and that "police power regulation amounts to a taking if it goes 'too
far' in diminishing the regulated landowner's property rights" (Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922)). Stoebuck, supra note 22, at 1069. Analogously, so-called two-tier analysis
under the equal protection clause permits of opposite results depending on whether a given value
system views a right as "fundamental" or a classification as "suspect." Each era I suspect will haveits own value system and individuals in the era will differ.
87. See Kronman, ContractLaw andDistributionJustice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980).
88. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978).
89. See Schwartz, supra, note 35.
90. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
91. Id. at 25-26 & n.25. This "double standard" was criticized in Justice Brennan's dissent. Id.
at 53 n. 16. But see Schwartz, supra note 35, at 106-07 (suggesting that the gold clause cases, Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935), and Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935),
provide such a dual standard).
92. 438 U.S. 234(1978).
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-93

The criteria used by the majority in Allied

StructuralSteel included whether the legislation was aimed at a generalized social problem 94 or at protecting "a broad societal interest rather
than a narrow class," 95 whether the legislation was of an emergency na97
ture. 96 or operated in an area "already subject to state regulation."
Justice Brennan in dissent was to say that "these rather vague criteria...
vest judges with broad subjective discretion to protect property interests
that happen to appeal to them." 98 His language is surely reminiscent of
the criticism of Lochner. It also is reminiscent of, for example, Justice
Black's criticism of the Frankfurter majority's "shocks the conscience"
due process test in Rochin v. California;99 John Hart Ely's criticism of the
abortion case Roe v. Wade; 00 or of the neo-criticism of the Warren
93. 431 U.S. at 61. See note 32 supra: the "invisible buzz saw" took off the Port Authority's
mass transit finger.
94. Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 247.
95. Id. at 249.
96. Id. Cf. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding mortgage
foreclosure moratorium during economic emergency).
97. 438 U.S. at 250.
98. Id.at261,
99. 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (forcible pumping of a suspect's stomach violated due process clause).
Justice Black's criticism of the vagueness of the test included the following:
These cases and others show the extent to which the evanescent standards of the majority's
philosophy have been used to nullify state legislative programs passed to suppress evil economic
practices. What paralyzing role this same philosophy will play in the future economic affairs of
this country is impossible to predict. Of even graver concern, however, is the use of the philosophy to nullify the Bill of Rights. I long ago concluded that the accordion-like qualities of this
philosophy must inevitably imperil all the individual liberty safeguards specifically enumerated
in the Bill of Rights. Reflection and recent decisions of this Court sanctioning abridgment of the
freedom of speech and press have strengthened this conclusion.
Id at 176-77 (Black. J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
100. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Professor Ely in The Wages of Crviug Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). said of the decision invalidating the Texas criminal abortion statute:
Of course a woman's freedom to choose an abortion is part of the "liberty" the Fourteenth
Amendment says shall not be denied without due process of law, as indeed is anyone's freedom
to do what he wants. But "due process" generally guarantees only that the inhibition be
procedurally fair and that it have some "rational" connection-though plausible is probably a
better word-with a permissible governmental goal. What is unusual about Roe is that the liberty involved is accorded a far more stringent protection, so stringent that a desire to preserve the
fetus's existence is unable to overcome it-a protection more stringent. I think it fair to say.
than that the present Court accords the freedom of the press explicitly guaranteed by the First
Amendment. What is frightening about Roe is that this super-protected right is not inferable
from the language of the Constitution, the framers' thinking respecting the specific problem in
issue, any general value derivable from the provisions they included, or the nation's governmental structure. Nor is it explainable in terms of the unusual political impotence of the group judicially protected vis-a-vis the interest that legislatively prevailed over it. And that. I believe-the
predictable early reaction to Roe notwithstanding ("more of the same Warren-type activism")-is a charge that can responsibly be leveled at no other decision of the past twenty years.
At times the inferences the Court has drawn from the values the Constitution marks for special
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Court's handling of civil rights generally. 101 Justice Brennan reiterates in
his Allied Structural Steel dissent the point that the majority decision
"threatens to undermine the jurisprudence of property rights developed
over the last 40 years" 102 -a "jurisprudence" which, I would add, consisted principally of abstention. Is it possible that, meaning no offense to
Justice Brennan, whom I deeply admire, whether another's views are
"threatening" or his principles "subjective" depends on one's own
value system?
Free Speech
Other signs of a "renaissance" of property rights are also evident. One
of the foremost American civil libertarians, Norman Dorsen, has perceptively suggested that since 1972 the first amendment cases decided by the
Supreme Court have had a distinct property rights tinge-even an underlying property rights rationale.1 03 I will only suggest his analysis here.
Dorsen points not just to the "private property" language in decisions
04
upholding free speech claims-for example, the flag desecration case,1
or the New Hampshire license plate case' 05-but also to the increasing
recognition of corporate rights of free speech 10 6 and the protection of
commercial speech. 107 He goes on to contrast these cases where private
property interests have coincided with free speech interests with cases
where the two interests have been in conflict, and property interests have
prevailed. The latter include the shopping center cases, 108 the Army miliprotection have been controversial, even shaky, but never before has its sense of an obligation to
draw one been so obviously lacking.
Id. at 935-37 (footnotes omitted).
101. E.g., R. FUNSTON, CONSTITUTIONAL COUNTERREVOLUTION ch. 8 (1977).
102. 438 U.S. at 259.
103. Dorsen & Gora, The Burger Court and Free Expression: Property Interests or Maximum
Protection (Feb. 6, 1979) (unpublished lecture in The Thomas M. Cooley Lectures series delivered at
Michigan Law School).
104. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 408-09 (1974) (per curiam): "First, this was a privately owned flag. . . . Second, appellant displayed his flag on private property."
105. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,713 (1977):
We are thus faced with the question of whether the State may constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private
property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the public. We
hold that the State may not do so.
106. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
107. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'h, 447 U.S. 557 (1980);
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
108. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). Cf.
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding that a state may interpret its own
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tary post case, 10 9 the municipal ordinance banning political advertising
but permitting commercial advertising in city-owned buses,"l 0 the broadening of defamation law liability,ll the Detroit ordinance on adult-use
zones, 112 and others. 113 One does not have to agree with all of Professor
Dorsen's examples to perceive that property rights have, as he puts it,
"played a surprisingly significant role in this Court's free speech decisions." 114 There are in fact decisions inconsistent with his thesis. 115 1 add
only that Dorsen is critical not of the role of private property in the society-the importance of which is recognized by other civil libertarian
commentators1 16-but rather of the use of property rights considerations
to determine free speech cases.
I am not sure that I fully agree with my friend Professor Dorsen that
this is what the Court has been doing. I suspect he would agree with me
that, all other things being equal, property rights considerations might
rightly have a bearing. If I cannot force picketers away from the street
outside my house, 117 for instance, surely I can keep them off "my" land
however protected their speech qua speech may be. I leave this point for
what it is worth. I do not suggest that property rights orientation underlies
all Supreme Court constitutional analysis today. I think, however, that
Dorsen's suggestion is a useful one, and that the level of property rights
in the present Court's scale of values is very high.
CASES UNDER THE JUST COMPENSATION CLAUSE
Rather than look at other areas-and we could, for instance, examine
securities law-I think it more fruitful to turn directly to the "takings
law," the law under the compensation clause, to determine where we are.
It may give us the best glance at where we are bound. The major Supreme
constitution's free speech guarantees so as to prevent a privately owned shopping center from excluding certain speakers and handbillers).
109. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
110. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
Ill. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire. 443
U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone. 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc.. 418
U.S. 323 (1974).
112. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
113. E.g.,. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977): Hynes v.
Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610(1976).
114. Dorsen & Gora, supra note 103, at 19.
115. E.g.. FCC v. Pacilica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. 547 (1978); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973).
116. E.g.. L. TRIBE, supra note 24, § 8-7. at453, § 11-4. at573-74; L. TRIBE. supra note 12.

at 56.
117.

See Carey v. Brown. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
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Court cases have over the years delved, it seems, somewhat shallowly
into takings theory. 118 Several reasons for this suggest themselves; I leave
them until later. The body of Supreme Court takings law, however, by
and large has consisted largely of ad hoc line drawing based upon a determination whether a person's "thing" has been "taken" by the state without proper justification, rather than an examination of whether the transfer
of a person's rights are compensable, and if so, what is "just" compensation.
In this scenario, one written for us over a hundred years and more, the
preliminary question under the just compensation clause of the fifth
amendment (subsumed in the fourteenth amendment' 19) has been whether
the taking is for a public purpose; absent that, the "taking" is void,
"tak[ing] property from A. and giv[ing] it to B.' 1 20 This question, William Stoebuck has suggested, is really a substantive due process question,
judicial analysis to the contrary. 121 Yet the fifth amendment says not only
that no person shall "be deprived of ...property, without due process of
law" but also that "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." Since the words of the Founders overlap, it
is not surprising that the Court has treated the public use question as a
preliminary one in takings analysis.
The principal question around which Supreme Court takings law has
revolved, however, is whether property has been "taken." This is a matter of dispute in the decided cases: physical invasion is clear in principle,
as in the case of flooding of land. 122 But, in application, in determining
when a physical invasion has taken place, the Supreme Court has, for
example, distinguished between those living less than 100 feet under a
flight path of an airplane123-their property is taken-and those living
along a railroad, with trains emitting smoke, soot, and sparks-their

property is not. 124
When we come to the exercise of the police powers, determining when
land use regulation becomes a taking, we have an extraordinary situation.
118. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at 113-14.
119. See Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry., 208 U.S. 598 (1908) (condemnation of land for spur
track to private business is for public purpose where state law so holds and hence is not forbidden
under fourteenth amendment).
120. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (emphasis added). See generally Michelman, supra note 20, at 1183-84.
121. See Stoebuck, supra note 22, at 1066. See also notes 45 & 86 and accompanying text supra. Professor Stoebuck does, however, take the position that the "public use" language of the fifth
amendment read properly implies that "a taking includes a transfer." Stoebuck, supra note 22, at
1087-89.
122. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-78 (1871).
123. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,261-62 (1946).
124. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
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Probably the central taking case, the one cited and quoted ad infinitum.
criticized by almost every commentaor, and setting the stage for all subsequent discussion, is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 125 written by
Justice Holmes, dissented to only by Justice Brandeis. The opinion contains one of Holmes's most famous aphorisms and discusses the central
question-whether there is a taking when there is a governmental limitation on use-a question confronting the basic property rights dilemma to
which I have already alluded. The case arose in a very narrow context.
that of a deed from a coal company of the land surface over its mine, with
the coal company reserving all mining rights and the grantee taking the
premises with all risks and waiving all damages claims. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania enacted a law forbidding mining which
caused the subsidence of structures used for human habitation, with certain exceptions inapplicable here. Justice Holmes, discussing the constitutionality of the statute, first referred to the qualification made by the
police power upon what he called the "seemingly absolute protection"shades of Locke-afforded to private property by the just compensation
clause, and noted "the natural tendency of human nature . . . to extend
the qualification more and more until at last private property disappears." 126 His aphorism followed, of course, as a "but" to the "natural
tendency": "The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as
127
a taking."
Now this startling announcement, coming from one who decried the
Court's use of substantive due process analysis, contains within it a significant element of truth. The truth is that the Pennsylvania statute, which
prohibited coal mining where it would affect surface habitation, did
rewrite the parties' expectations, at least the mineowners'. It thus reduced
the value of the mining rights. In the words of the opinion, the statute
admittedly "destroy[ed] previously existing rights of property and contract." 128 Thus, by causing a diminution in value of the mine, the statute,
were it to be enforced, would amount in the Court's opinion to a taking.
True, Holmes acknowledged, requiring pillars of coal to be left along the
line of adjoining property to protect miners' safety was a matter of public
interest which the Court had previously declared was proper for the legislature to enact. 129 But, as the friend of William James so often put legal
125. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
126. Id. at 415.
127. Id.
128. Id. at413.
129. Id. at 415 (citing Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania. 232 U.S. 531 (1914)). Holmes did
not say "public interest"; he referred rather to 'an average reciprocity of advantage that has been
recognized as a justification of various laws." Id.
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propositions, it was "a question of degree-and therefore [could] not be
disposed of by general propositions." 130 The statute was unconstitutional
as "going beyond" any of the decided cases. 131
Only six years later, in Miller v. Schoene, 132 however, a unanimous
Court reminded us 133 that the majority opinion in PennsylvaniaCoal did
not contain the whole truth. In Miller the Court upheld a Virginia statute
requiring owners of diseased red cedar trees to cut them down without
receiving compensation from the state because the contagion might
spread to neighboring apple orchards. The "public" interest was equated
with the "private" interest of apple orchard growers. Redistribution of
property from cedar tree owners to apple orchard owners was justified in
the public interest.134 Beyond this, the Court recognized that whichever
way the state (or the Court) decided the case, "[i]t would have been none
the less a choice."1 35 The Court "none the less" permitted the state to
choose without its constituting a taking. Why was such a legislative
choice not permissible in Pennsylvania? Do the seemingly conflicting re130. Id. at416. Compare id. with W. JAMES, PRAGMATISM (1907).
131. 260 U.S. at 416. Justice Brandeis, in dissent, sounding like Holmes inLochner,stated:
Coal in place is land, and the right of the owner to use his land is not absolute. He may not so use
it as to create a public nuisance, and uses, once harmless, may, owing to changed conditions,
seriously threaten the public welfare. Whenever they do, the Legislature has power to prohibit
such uses without paying compensation; and the power to prohibit extends alike to the manner,
the character and the purpose of the use. Are we justified in declaring that the Legislature of
Pennsylvania has, in restricting the right to mine anthracite, exercised this power so arbitrarily
as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment?
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the
State of rights in property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the
public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in
question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the
possession of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely
prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public.
Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious-as it may because of further changes in local
or social conditions-the restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be free to
enjoy his property as heretofore.
Id. at 417.
132. 276 U.S. 272(1928).
133. I say "remind us" because Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), had already
permitted a city to close a brickyard, originally located beyond city limits, as a nuisance or noxious
use, without compensation for a decline in property value of about 92% ($800,000 to $60,000). This
case is much criticized. E.g., L. BECKER, supranote 19, at 113, 129 n. 14. But it is often followed.
E.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
134. The unanimity of the Court should be contrasted with the powerful argument of the cedar
tree owners that, of the two species of valuable private property involved, one was simply selected
for destruction in order to protect the other. See Miller, 276 U.S. at 273-76. This latter argument has
support today in R.H. Coase's seminal article The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1
(1960).
135. 276 U.S. at 279.
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suits in these two cases simply reflect the economic fact that the statute
condemned in Pennsylvania Coal took from a profitable state industry,
anthracite coal mining, 136 while the statute in Miller gave to a profitable
37
state industry, apple orchards?
One hesitates to think that Justice Holmes would adopt a constitutional
double standard as between property owners, although one may be disturbed as a matter of intellectual candor that the Miller opinion did not
cite Pennsylvania Coal. One reason for this, suggested by the Court, is
that the cedar tree owners are like the brickyard owner whose factory lies
well beyond the city limits when built, but is finally incorporated within
them. 38 He was said to be making a "noxious use," as by selling
beer,

39

exporting unripe oranges,

40

or emitting dense smoke, ' 4 '-other

property uses regulated under the police power without being considered
takings. But the mining of coal under a person's house is quite noxious to
the house-owner, at least if the house falls in. And, as Justice Brandeis
pointed out in dissent to Pennsylvania Coal, "uses, once harmless, may,
42
owing to changed conditions, seriously threaten the public welfare."'
The previously decided brickyard case, Hadacheck v. Sebastian,143
comes quickly to mind.
Pennsylvania Coal has suggested that a taking occurs when a prop136. There is language in Pennsylvania Coal that suggests the importance of coal mining. See
260 U.S. at 413-14.
137. There is language in Miller that explicitly notes the economic importance of apple growing
in Virginia. See 276 U.S. at 279.
Professor Stoebuck considers Miller an "emergency" case. involving a governmental power different from and historically superior to the eminent domain power. Stoebuck. supra note 22. at 1067
n.51. I remain unconvinced. If Miller was an emergency case. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394 (1915), and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (19621. remain as police power
takings without just compensation. See note 133 supra.
138. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). Cf. Remman v. City of Little Rock, 237
U.S. 171 (1915) (upholding the banishment of a well-established livery stable from one section of a
city): Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878) (upholding the outlawing of
transporting putrid animal matter through the streets of Chicago). But see Dobbins v. City of Los
Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904) (arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of police power amounted to a
taking of property).
139. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (destroying beer business by enforcing state prohibition on sale of alcohol). Contra, Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 390-92 (1856) (invalidating
state liquor prohibition statute). See generally Bartemeyer v. Iowa. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129 (1873). I
agree with Stoebuck that the "noxious use'" test is not a "taking" test but is a test of "whether the
regulatory measure addresses a problem that the government might legitimately try to solve." Stoebuck, supra note 22, at 1062.
140. Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915).
141. Northwestern Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916). Stoebuck analyzes the
-noxious use" theory as being a "false" theory of taking law; rather it is a part of substantive due
process. I agree.
142. 260 U.S. at 417.
143. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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erty's value has been virtually destroyed. This suggestion has been called
by some the "dominant doctrinal model of takings law."' 144 In Hadacheck, however, the loss of the brickyard owner who had built in the
country, but whose land was incorporated within the Los Angeles city
limits, was eighty-eight percent of the value of his land, but was held not
to constitute a "taking." 145 A zoning ordinance was upheld in the landmark case of Village ofEuclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 146 despite a seventyfive percent loss of value to the landowner. Or was, as some insist, 147 the
brickyard case itself wrongly decided, and Miller with it? Is what is
"noxious" dependent on the subjective view of every Justice? Or is it a
shorthand way of stating an analytical formula to resolve, in particular
property cases that involve effects upon others, the underlying philosophic dilemma to which I have pointed? In any event, is not the formula
totally unsatisfactory, merely an after-the-fact justification for a predetermined result?
The inconsistencies contained in these cases have been alluded to by
the commentators. 14 8 The law of takings, at least as expressed by the Supreme Court, has essentially been without doctrinal advance for fifty
years, 14 9 and the two opposing and inconsistent lines of authority have
not been explained or resolved; they are simply there.
144. Sax II, supranote 22, at 151. See Michelman, supranote 20, at 1190.
145. Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 405, 409-11.
146. 272 U.S. 365,384 (1926).
147. E.g., L. BECKER, supranote 19, at 113, 129 n. 14.
148. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at 113-15, 153-55; Michelman, supra note 20, at
1196-1201; Sax II, supranote 22, at 151-55; Stoebuck, supranote 22, at 1070, 1079.
149. Ackerman says:
The Court has made no important doctrinal advance since Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, n.2
supra. In most recent cases it has not attempted to improve upon Holmes's obiter glorification of
ad hoc decision making, and has instead proceeded immediately to a particularistic weighing-up
of factors whose character and weight are never clearly assessed. Even Professor Dunham, who
sees patterns in some Supreme Court decisions, confesses perplexity when confronted with other
holdings, declaring, "Older tests and guides have given way, and there is a tendency in the
opinions to substitute a vague ethical standard for any objective standard." Allison Dunham,
"Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation
Law," 1962 Supreme Court Rev. 63, 73.
B. ACKERMAN, supranote 21, at 236 n.9.
Michelman says:
Examination ofjudicial decisions and of legal commentary focused on them indicates that one
of four factors has usually been deemed critical in classifying an occasion as compensable or
not: (1) whether or not the public or its agents have physically used or occupied something
belonging to the claimant; (2) the size of the harm sustained by the claimant or the degree to
which his affected property has been devalued; (3) whether the claimant's loss is or is not
outweighed by the public's concomitant gain; (4) whether the claimant has sustained any loss
apart from restriction of his liberty to conduct some activity considered harmful to other people.
There follow some brief comments on each of these four "tests." The discussions are, at this
point, tentative and incomplete. Their purpose is the limited one of showing that none of the
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This may all have been well during a time of expanding social legislation when property rights were essentially confined to a legal dust bin.
But we think, as suggested at the beginning of this article, of property
rights as consisting of relationships among persons with respect to things,
and we add to that the extraordinary awakening of the public in the last

twenty years to the interdependence of human beings and resourcesobjects, things, property if you will-transcending city, state, or even
national boundary lines. Can we any longer afford to be thinking constitutionally in the simplistic, ad hoc terms of the past? Leaving aside the
considerable risk of continuous inconsistency, are we simply to be left
with the "non sequitur" -having
its origin in Holmes' Pennsylvania
Coal aphorism-implied by John Costonis' phrase, the "loose language
of innumerable zoning opinions," that "overregulation is a 'taking,'
150
hence remediable exclusively through eminent domain proceedings"?
Would it not be just as easy to say, as suggested by John Costonis and the
New York Court of Appeals, 151 that regulation beyond the limits of the
police power is simply invalid as such unless the property owner is injured in ways that cannot be rectified through noncompensatory relief?
And, on the other side of the coin, does not the "overregulation equals
standard criteria yields a sound and self-sufficient rule of decision-that each of them. when
attempts are made to erect it into a general principle, is either seriously misguided. ruinously
incomplete, or uselessly overbroad. The discussions tend to overlook certain redeeming qualities in the criteria-their cores of valid insight and their embodiment (and concealment) of qutte
relevant, even if not necessarily conclusive, inquiries. These aspects are developed at a later
point.
Michelman, supra note 20, at 1183-84.
Sax says:
The wetlands cases, cited in note 4 supra, exemplify [the] approach [of asking only whether
and to what extent the owner's ability to profit from the piece of property in question. considered
by itself, has been impaired). To be sure, one finds the seeds of contextual analysis in the cases
occasionally, as in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.. 272 U.S. 365. 387-88 (1926). or in
Justice Holmes' famous opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Holmes notes. for example, that "some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must
yield to the police power." Id. at 413. He also indicates that in some circumstances there might
be found "a public interest sufficient to warrant . . . a destruction . . " of the owner's opportunity to profit from his property. Id. at 414. Holmes' observations are, however, only suggestive and tantalizingly vague. He never explored the question of context systematically nor did
he treat it as more than an inevitable practical exception to the obvious rule that for government
to make it "commercially impracticable" to profit from one's property is, constitutionally. to
take it. See note 18 i!fra. Subsequent judicial authority has focused on the rule and rarely explores the implications of the "exception" Holmes observed. Courts do some balancing of interests to avoid the extreme implications of the dominant rule, but there is a hierarchy in which the
right to profit stands first, with a grudging exception for exigent public need.
Sax II, supra note 22, at 151 n.7.
150. Costonis, The Disparity Issue, supra note 22, at 405 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 405-06; Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587. 350
N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976). See Stoebuck, supra note 22, at 1097-99.
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taking" syllogism, insofar as it implies that the regulation is proper if the
property owner is compensated for the decline in value of his property,
become a method in ambiguous or gray-area cases of requiring the public
to bear costs that are really private in nature? If so, to this extent, Pennsylvania Coal may even be said to be an encroachment upon Lochner52
theory private property and contract rights. 1
When, then, must a diminution in value caused by governmental overregulation be compensated for as a "taking"? Or does any "taking" require compensation, not just for lost value, but for the entire value of the
property taken? And if "taking law" is insufficient to handle the complex
matter of legislation affecting property, should we-despite the supposed
demise of Lochner-look back again to the due process clause for protection of property rights in a substantive sense? After virtual judicial abdication, are we coming full circle to substantive due process? Would this
be bad in light of the chaotic state of takings law?
It may be anticlimactic to note that most recent takings cases in the
Supreme Court only begin to address these questions without, unfortunately, adding much new insight to takings law. There is, however, one
very interesting exception.
MODERN SUPREME COURT TAKINGS CASES
The first of these commenced truly as a classic-one of the more complicated takings cases ever to reach the Supreme Court, Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City.153 A six-three majority upheld
New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law against fifth amendment
attack 154 by the owner of Grand Central Terminal. The owner had
planned to construct a multistory office building over the Terminal, which
had been designated an historic "landmark," but the plan was rejected by
the City Landmarks Preservation Commission as destructive of Grand
Central's historic and aesthetic features. Typical of many, New York
152. See L. TRIBE, supra note 24, § 8-5, at 444-46. Pennsylvania Coal thus viewed is a twoedged sword, and its dicta are frequently quoted to support opposing results.

153. 438 U.S. 104(1978).
154. Actually, the attack was as a "taking" under the fifth amendment as made applicable to the
states by the fourteenth amendment. See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239
(1897). The New York Court of Appeals had also decided the case in part on the basis of a social
increment theory of valuation. Under that theory, the "publicly created" components of the value of
the property-those elements of its value attributable to the "efforts of organized society" or to the
"social complex" in which the terminal is located-had to be excluded from the base value on which
a reasonable return is to be calculated. See Costonis, The Disparity Issue, supra note 22, at 416-17.
The Supreme Court did not address the question whether it is permissible or feasible to separate out
the "social increments" of the value of property. See 438 U.S. at 121 n.23. See generally 3 N.
WILLIAMs. AMERICAN PLANNING LAW § 7 IA. I1(Cum. Supp. 1980).
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City's landmark law was designed to preserve the site in private as opposed to public ownership and to permit the "reasonable" use of it, subject to the ultimate sanction of securing advance approval from the Preservation Commission to alter exterior architectural features or construct
exterior improvements. New York zoning laws did, however, permit
landmark-site owners to transfer development rights from their parcel to
neighboring property, employing a novel concept that may have been
specifically designed with Grand Central in mind. Thus the Terminal
owner had marketable rights in lieu of the right to develop the landmark
site, a form of zoning compensation transferable in a commercialized area
into dollars and cents as an offset to the diminution in value of the basic
parcel.

55

1

The majority opinion, by Justice Brennan, first reviewed what he
called the "jurisprudence" of takings law under the fifth amendment.
After disavowing that "takings" necessarily involve a transfer of physical control,' 56 the opinion conceded that "this Court, quite simply, has
been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice
and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately
concentrated on a few persons," 57 and that the Court was engaged in one
of "these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."' 58 The opinion then
listed the "factors" which it considered significant, but these~were only
two: (1) "economic impact," including that on "investment-backed expectations";159 and (2) "the character of the governmental action," that
is, whether the interference arises from some public social program or is
simply a physical invasion by the government.160 The "jurisprudence"
first referred to is the group of the governmental laws or programs, held
legitimate, that necessarily, though adversely, affect recognized eco162
nomic values.' 61 This group included exercises of the taxing power.
actions causing economic harm but not interfering with "reasonable ex155. Evidently some of these marketable rights were sold for two million dollars. N. WILLIAMS.
supra note 154. at 194.
156. 438 U.S. at 123 n.25.
157. Id. at 124.
158. Id.
159. Id. "'Investment-backed expectations," a new and loose phrase. is bound to be used by
developers, see N. WILLIAMS. supranote 154. at 190, or by courts supporting those expectations. But
see note 198 and accompanying text infra.
160. 438 U.S. at 124.
161. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393. 413 (1922).
162. Penn Central. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). No examples are cited, nor is reference made to
Marshall's proposition that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy." and -'that the power to

destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create." McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
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pectations," '1 63 and zoning and other land-use cases, such as Miller and
Hadacheck.I64 Then the countervailing "jurisprudence" was cited, including cases such as Pennsylvania Coal, where a statute is held so to
frustrate "distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a 'taking,'"165 and United States v. Causby, 166 where "acquisitions of resources to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions . . . constitute
'takings.' "167 1have recited the Penn Centralopinion's cataloging of the
"jurisprudence" to demonstrate that the "jurisprudence" is static, con68
fused and conflicting, as it has been at least since Pennsylvania Coal.1
The Court then went on to consider the specific arguments by the Terminal owner. The first argument was based upon the physical invasion of
69
the airspace above the Terminal and relied on UnitedStates v. Causby. 1
The Court disposed of this argument by reference to earlier decisions upholding laws which restricted development of air rights or which prohibited subjacent or lateral development of particular parcels. 170 The Court
also stated:
In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a
taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action
and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the
parcel as a whole-here, the city tax block designated as the "land71
mark site." 1
The second argument by appellants was based upon diminution of
value, and was rejected by the Court, which cited Euclid, where there
was a seventy-five percent diminution in value caused by the zoning law,
and Hadacheck, where there was an eighty-eight percent diminution in
value. 172 The Court rejected as well further arguments by the appellants.
For example, the claim that, unlike historic-district legislation, 173 the
163. 438 U.S. at 124-25 (citing, e.g., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229
U.S. 53 (1913) (no property interest can exist in navigable waters)).
164. Id. at 125-27.
165. Id. at 127-28.
166. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
167. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 128.
168. See notes 122-152 and accompanying text supra.
169. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
170. 438 U.S. at 130. The Court added: " 'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel
into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been
entirely abrogated." Id. One may be pardoned, I hope, for asking "why"? The answer is not to be
found in the next and concluding sentence in this section of the opinion, quoted in the text.
171. Id. at 130-31. How the air space above the Terminal can be distinguished from the pillars
of coal below the surface in PennsylvaniaCoal, is, to me, a mystery.
172. Id. at 131. There is no mention of the possibility that both cases, or at least Hadacheck,
might have been wrongly decided.
173. See generally Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 905 (1976).
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New York law was selective was met by reference to New York's comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic interest, in which over
400 landmarks and thirty-one districts had received historic designation. 174 The claim that the New York law was "inevitably arbitrary or at
least subjective" was met by reference to Penn Central's failure to seek
review of the original designation; 175 and the claim that the law was dis76
criminatory was met by reference to Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,1
Hadacheck, and Miller v. Schoene, 177 all of which parenthetically were
also in a very real sense discriminatory. 178 Finally, the Court rejected appellants' argument based on Causby, that they deserved compensation because the government was acting in an enterprise capacity. The Court
noted that the law in question neither exploited appellants' parcel for city
purposes nor facilitated any entreprenurial operations of the city. 179 Thus,
the Court held there was no invalidity by virtue of a failure to provide

"just compensation."

180

The Court then went on to consider, as a wholly separate question, the
Pennsylvania Coal question whether there was such regulation-here
said to be an "interference . . . of such a magnitude"-as to amount to
an exercise of eminent domain. 181 Answering this negatively, the Court
found that there was no interference with present use, that present use
permits a reasonable return on the investment, that some vague use of the
air rights might be permissible, and that the development rights would
82
mitigate any financial burden imposed by the regulation. 1
The dissent in Penn Centraladded little to the "jurisprudence," except
a quote from United States v. GeneralMotors Co., 183 explicitly recognizing the bundle-of-rights theory of property law. 184 The dissent basically
174. 438 U.S. at 132.
175. Id. at 132-33.
176. 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (owner of sand and gravel quarry enjoined from continuing the use to
which the property had been devoted).
177. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).

178. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133-34. Of these three cases, the Court said that they:
are better understood as resting not on any supposed 'noxious" quality of the prohibited uses
but rather on the ground that the restrictions were reasonably related to the implementation of a
policy-not unlike historic preservation-expected to produce a widespread public benefit and
applicable to all similarly situated property.
Id. at 133 n.30. If the laws were designed to produce a widespread public benefit, why should not the
victims receive public compensation?
179. Id. at 135. But see The Supreme Court. 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57. 229 n.46 (1978).
See also Sax I, supra note 22, and Stoebuck. supra note 22. at 1091-99. which would make this the
"'true" test of a taking.
180. 438 U.S. at 136.
181. Id. at 136-37. One had thought this question already answered.
182.

Id.

183.
184.

323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945).
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 142-43 (Rehnquist. J.. dissenting).
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adopted the opposing line of cases, inconsistent with those cited by the
majority, and distinguished Hadacheck and progeny as involving "noxious" uses. 185 The dissent would have, unobjectionably, remanded on the
question whether development rights constitute "just" compensation, as
they would probably only partially offset value diminution.1 86 And the
dissent concluded, not surprisingly, with a quote from Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal, warning that the courts guard against taking "a shorter cut
than the constitutional way of paying for" 187 improvement in the public
condition. 188 Such a phrase is neat, if a bit rhetorical.
I have gone into Penn Central in some detail in order to make two
points:
1. The takings "jurisprudence" of the Supreme Court is still in an unsatisfactory ad hoc stage, with a lack of development of analytical principle or reconciliation of conflicting lines of precedent; and
2. As a result, in a gray-area case like Penn Central,that jurisprudence
permits purely subjective results, with the conflicting precedents simply
available as makeweights that may fit pre-existing value judgments as to
the relative worth of the legislation as opposed to the importance or dollar
value of the property rights at stake. 189
The second recent and important case is Andrus v. Allard,190 a unanimous decision, with the opinion again written by Justice Brennan. There
the Court upheld, against attack by sellers of Indian artifacts, regulations
of the Secretary of the Interior prohibiting the sale of feathers or other
parts of protected birds obtained prior to the enactment of the Migratory
Bird Treaty and Eagle Protection Acts. Justice Brennan noted that in the
district court the argument of the sellers was "cast . . .in terms of economic substantive due process," but before the Supreme Court the sellers
185. Id. at 145 & n.8. In the process, Justice Rehnquist makes two arguments some might consider irrelevant, if not rhetorical: (1) that Penn Central is being penalized because "too good a job
was done in designing and building it," id. at 146 (this argument applies as well to historic districts);
and (2) that there is "a multimillion dollar loss" that is "uniquely felt and is not offset by any
benefits flowing from" other landmarks preservation in New York, id. at 147. This second argument
involves highly debatable fact-finding, contrary to that in the New York courts and is worrisome
insofar as it implies that only big property holders suffer "takings," or that wealth is somehow
equated with property.
186. Id. at 150-52.
187. PennsylvaniaCoal, 260 U.S. at 416.
188. 438 U.S. at 153 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
189. I disagree with the editors of the Harvard Law Review who said about the case: "With the
tests upon which many courts have come to rely no longer controlling, the protection of private
property from governmental interference will depend more than ever on each court's subjective interpretation of 'fairness and justice.' " The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 232
(1978). The "controlling" tests, however relied upon by the courts, have always permitted subjective interpretations. Penn Centralmerely shows that they still do.
190. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
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have used "the terminology of the Takings Clause." t 9 1 The Court then
referred to its Penn Central exposition on the takings clause. It is worth
repeating here what the Court said because it summarizes in a nutshell,
for a unanimous Court, the present state of Supreme Court takings law, in
essence equating it with substantive due process, and reemphasizing its
substantive nature:
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 123-128 (1978), is our most recent exposition on the Takings
Clause. That exposition need not be repeated at length here. Suffice
it to say that government regulation-by definition-involves the
adjustment of rights for the public good. Often this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private
property. To require compensation in all such circumstances would
effectively compel the government to regulate by purchase. "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 413 (1922); see Penn Central, supra, at 124.
The Takings Clause, therefore, preserves governmental power to
regulate, subject only to the dictates of " 'justice and fairness.' "
Ibid.; see Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). There
is no abstract or fixed point at which judicial intervention under the
Takings Clause becomes appropriate. Formulas and factors have
been developed in a variety of settings. See Penn Central, supra, at
123-128. Resolution of each case, however, ultimately calls as much
for the exercise of judgment as for the application of logic. 192
The Court then engaged in a bundle-of-rights analysis, emphasizing the
lack of physical invasion or expropriation, and the denial of only the right
to sell and not the right to possess, transport, donate, or devise the artifacts. 193 The loss of future profits was said to provide, absent "any physical property restriction, . . . a slender reed upon which to rest a takings
claim," since "[p]rediction of profitability is essentially a matter of reasoned speculation that courts are not especially competent to per-

191. Id. at 64n. 21.
192. Id. at 65.
193. Id. at 65-66. The right to sell is certainly high on the scale of any listing of rights in the
"bundle."
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And reference was made to Mugler v. Kansas195 and other
cases in which the Court upheld, against fifth amendment challenge, statutes forbidding the sale of liquors manufactured before the statutes were
passed. 196 The late Professor Thomas Reed Powell would have found
some amusement in analogizing the eagle feathers to that most "noxious" of beverages-firewater.
The third in our series of recent takings cases is KaiserAetna v. United
States. 197 Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court in this land
development case and Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented. A private lessee of a Hawaiian lagoon-Kuapa Pond-converted
the pond, by dredging and filling operations done with the acquiescence
of the Corps of Engineers, into a marina, and thereby connected it to a
navigable bay and the Pacific Ocean. The Court held that petitioners were
entitled to compensation if the Government wanted to allow the public
free access to the lagoon. The Court, in its factual statement, emphasized
the "millions of dollars" invested in making the improvements "on the
assumption that it was a privately owned pond leased to them."1 98 The
Court also mentioned that waterfront and other lessees and non-resident
boat owners pay maintenance and security fees. 199 It did not mention how
many "investment expectations" had already been realized by development of the land adjacent to the pond into some 1,500 marina and eightysix non-marina lots, with some 22,000 people housed in the community.
Nor was any other favorable economic impact from opening of the marina
to the sea mentioned.
On the takings issue the Court referred to Penn Central and followed
form.

' 19 4

194. Id. at 66. This reliance on uncertainty, especially by way of citation to a contract damages
article, Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936), is
interesting.
The Court also makes a "throw-away" argument, or better suggestion, that the sellers might exhibit the artifacts for an admissions charge. This is reminiscent of the any-conceivable-fact type of
speculation that rests on nothing in the record, which is not to condemn it, but only to equate it with
the moribund state of substantive due process law after Lochner. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726 (1963).
195. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Stoebuck treats Mugler as the leading case in the line of authority
contrary to Pennsylvania Coal. Stoebuck, supranote 22, at 1069. I prefer Miller, see note 137 supra,
since I consider Mugler as involving the peculiarly regulable object of intoxicating spirits. But logically there is not much difference; destruction of the bar business helped out the soft-drink people.
196. E.g., James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545 (1924); Jacob Ruppert, Inc. v.
Caffey, 251 U.S. 264 (1920).
197. 444U.S. 164(1979).
198. Id. at 169. Since it appears that the developer had a marina-style community of some
22,000 people and approximately 1,500 marina waterfront lot lessees, id. at 167, one would suppose
that the investment in dredging was to make the land more salable, and that whether or not the
dredged pond would be open to the public was not the most important, let alone the exclusive, factor
behind the petitioners' decision to invest in improvements.
199. Id. at 168.
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its "ad hoc, factual inquiries" method of analysis.20 0 The Court also referred to several cases upholding navigational servitudes in the public. 2 0
But Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court distinguished these navigational servitude cases by talking about the investment of "substantial
amounts of money in making improvements" to "what was once a private pond" and concluded-again shades of John Locke-that "the
owner has somehow lost one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property-the right to exclude
others. '202 The right to exclude is emphasized throughout the opinion as
"universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right," 20 3
reminiscent of William M. Evarts' argument in Lochner's state court predecessor, the so-called Tenement House Cigar Case:2 04 "Depriving an
owner of property of one of its attributes is depriving him of his property
within the constitutional provisions.' '205 The Kaiser Aetna opinion adhered closely to the Holmes aphorism in saying: "This is not a case in
which the Government is exercising its regulatory power in a manner that
will cause an insubstantial devaluation of petitioners' private property;
rather, the imposition of the navigational servitude in this context will
result in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina. "206
The KaiserAetna dissent, written by Justice Blackmun, first made the
point that the pond was now navigable in fact and that how it became that
way was immaterial. 207 The dissent then relied upon the federal government's servitude with respect to navigable waters 208 and concluded that
the developers "have acted at their own risk" and that "[tlhe chief value
of the pond in its present state obviously is a value of access to navigable
water.' '209
The fourth recent case is Agins v. Cit' of Tiburon. 2 10 There the Court
200. Id. at 174-175.
201. Id. at 175-176 (citing United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917): United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co.. 229 U.S. 53 (1913): Scranton v. Wheller. 179 U.S. 141 (1900)).

202.

Id. at 176. This is the first case I have seen suggesting that some "sticks" are more funda-

mental than others. Of course, in the abstract, the stick here can hardly compare with those for which

no compensation was ever received, as in Hadacheck.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 179-80.
In re Jacobs. 98 N.Y. 98 (1885).
Id. at 106.
444 U.S. at 180. This is. strictly speaking, not true: it results in "'invasion" of the waters.

not of the marina iself.
207. Id. at 183-84.
208. Id. at 186-87.
209. Id. at 190. It is fascinating to me that neither majority not dissent refer to the probable fact
that access to the pond enhanced the value of the adjoining land to a degree more than sufficient to
offset the cost of the dredging.
210. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 1 omit United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980). a takings case

which is irrelevant here because it simply construed a federal statute. 25 U.S.C. § 357 (1976). per-
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upheld a residential zoning ordinance enacted after the appellants had acquired five of California's finest acres in the heights of the City of Tiburon, overlooking beautiful San Francisco Bay. The zoning ordinance limited development according to a formula to from one to five single-family
residences on the five acre tract-what for practical purposes is at best
one-acre zoning. Until recently it had been surprising to.me that the Court
took the case at all since one-acre zoning has been in effect in thousands
upon thousands of American towns, cities, and villages for decades. 2 11
The much more interesting case, Professors Charles Haar or Norman Williams would suggest, would be a more stringent "exclusionary zoning"
case 2 1 ---zoning with a five acre or fifteen acre per one-residential-lot restriction, or no mobile homes or other multiple dwelling housing, or permitting or requiring, say, 2,500 square feet minimum area for a residence. It was to be totally expected, therefore, that a unanimous Supreme
Court upheld the Tiburon ordinance as a valid exercise of the police
power to protect Tiburon residents from the perceived ill-effects of urbanization, 213 and to provide "careful and orderly development of residential property with provision for open-space areas. ' 2 14 The Court, of
course, cited Euclid, the first zoning case, which permitted the exclusion
of commercial uses, as well as Penn Centraland Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas.215 The Court, in Tiburon, concedes the obvious, that the zoning
taining to Indian lands. The construction permitted condemnation only by judicial proceeding, as
opposed to an "inverse condemnation" action by a landowner (recovering compensation for a taking
by a physical intrusion).
211. See Williams & Norman, ExclusionaryLand Use Controls:The Case of North-EasternNew
Jersey, 22 SYRAcUSE L. REV. 475 (1971). Perhaps the Court took the case because the California
court thought that the zoning deprived the owner of any reasonably beneficial use. Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 80 Cal. App. 3d. 255, 145 Cal. Rptr. 476, 481 (1978); see Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24
Cal. 3d 266, 274, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 376 (1979). See also San Diego Gas & Elec.
Co. v. City of San Diego, 101 S.Ct. 1287, 1292 n.8 (1981).
212. The first commentators to call attention to the problem of exclusionary zoning were Haar,
Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1051 (1953), and
Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 317 (1955). See also
Babcock & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1040
(1963).
Reminded by Norman Williams, I note that zoning for minimum building size is probably the
clearest case of explicitly exclusionary zoning.
213. The Court stated:
is in the public interest to avoid unnecessary conThe City Council of Tiburon found that "[i]t
version of open space land to strictly urban uses, thereby protecting against the resultant adverse
impacts, such as air, noise and water pollution, traffic congestion, destruction of scenic beauty,
disturbance of the ecology and the environment, hazards related to geology, fire and flood, and
other demonstrated consequences of urban sprawl." Ordinance No. 124 N.S. § l(c).
447 U.S. at261 n.8.
214. Id. at 262.
215. 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding anti-commune zoning). This is an equal protection rather
than a takings case, though it was written in the nature of an environmental protection opinion. But
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ordinance "limit[s] development" 2 16 but points out that it does not "extinguish a fundamental attribute of ownership," 2 17 evidently a future battle ground given Kaiser Aetna. Finally the Court noted that "appellants
are free to pursue their reasonable investment expectations," and, therefore, they have not been denied "the 'justice and fairness' guaranteed by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.", 218 What the "reasonable investment expectations" of the Tiburon developers were is a matter for some
speculation, however; obviously those expectations were high enough to
warrant appeal to the Supreme Court. The conclusion that the appellants
were not denied the "justice and fairness" guaranteed by the amendments is purely a conclusion-correct because the Court said it wasstating the Supreme Court's decision in the case. I would concede that
any contrary decision in this case would have stunned the real estate
world to its foundations.
The mystery about Tiburon that the Court took the case at all is solved
by reading a case that has come down since almost all of the foregoing
was originally written. That is yet another "inverse condemnation" case,
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego.2 19 The case involved
a suit for just compensation by a utility company for rezoning of its land,
acquired for a nuclear facility but abandoned as such, from industrial to
open-space lands. It is interesting because it shows the state of the art in
Supreme Court takings law and suggests the unlikely result that under the
fifth amendment there may be no such thing as a police power or land-use
regulation that is merely invalid as such without requiring just compensation.
The plurality, with the concurrence of Justice Rehnquist, considered
that the state court decree was not final and therefore dismissed the appeal, because " 'the federal constitutional question embraces not only a
taking, but a taking on payment of just compensation,' " so that " '[a]
state judgment is not final unless it covers both aspects of that integral
problem.' "220 In doing so the plurality said, with reference to the California Court of Appeal's holding on the merits that monetary compensation
cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down anti-extended-family zoning). Belle Terre was the first zoning case taken by the Supreme Court in 46 years. so that the great

mass of zoning law has evolved in the state courts. One wonders whether he can credit the story that
Justice Douglas' opinion in that case was affected by a large group of noisy students moving onto his
street just before the case was argued.
216. 447 U.S. at 262.
217. Id. (citing Kaiser Aetna, presumably because the right to exclude there was a "'fundamental
attribute of ownership,' thus perpetuating the thought that there are preferred sticks in the bundle).
218. Id. at 262-63. See note 159 supra.
219.

101S. Ct. 1287(1981).

220. Id. at 1294 (quoting North Dakota Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores. Inc., 414
U.S. 156, 163 (1973)).
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is not an appropriate remedy for any taking of appellant's property that
may have occurred, 221 "we are frank to say that the federal constitutional
aspects of that issue are not to be cast aside lightly .... ,,222
Justice Brennan, writing also for Justices Marshall, Stewart, and Powell, read the California Court of Appeal's decision somewhat differently in
terms of availability of remedy, to find its judgment final and hence
appealable. 223 That is immaterial for our purposes since the decision will
be resolved on remand when the court of appeal or the California Supreme Court tells the high Court what it meant. What is important is that
Justice Brennan's plurality 224 read the court of appeal's decision, along
225
with that of the California Supreme Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon
and the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 226 all as standing for the dual proposition (a)
that a police power regulation may be examined only under the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments and not the just compensation clause, 227 and (b) that therefore a regulatory police power exercise can never effect a taking 228 so as to require the awarding of
compensation. In other words the Brennan plurality read the California
and New York decisions as the escape from the regulatory-taking dilemma which had plagued the law since Pennsylvania Coal. This escape
was visualized with joy by notable commentators, including but not limited to the University of Washington's William Stoebuck,2 29 who perceived that the taking issue is reached only after the substantive due process issue has been determined and then only when a transfer to the city or
state is effected.
It may come as no surprise at this point that the Brennan plurality held
that the California (and New York) decisions "flatly [contradict] clear

221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1296-1301 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As to the problems with plurality decisionmaking, see Note, PluralityDecisionsand JudicialDecisionmaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1127(1981).
224. Since Justice Brennan's group of four were the only Justices to reach the merits of the case,
it was a "plurality" as to those issues reached. I shall, therefore, hereinafter refer to their views on
the merits as those of a "plurality."
225. 24 Cal. 3d 266,277,598 P.2d 25, 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 378 (1979).
226. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 594-96, 350 N.E.2d 381, 384-86, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8-9, cert. denied,
429 U.S. 990 (1976).
227. 101 S. Ct. at 1298 n.4.
228. Id.; see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 120-21 (1978)
(referring to the New York Court of Appeals in Penn Centralas so holding).
229. Stoebuck, supra note 22, at 1097; see Costonis, "Fair" Compensation, supra note 22;
Marcus, A Grand Slam Central TerminalDecision: A Euclidfor Landmarks, FavorableNotice for
TDR andA Resolution of the RegulatorylTakingImpasse, 7 ECOL. L. Q. 731,749 n.97 (1978); Sax I,
supranote 22.
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precedents of this Court. "230 That is inevitable, given that the precedents
are conflicting. But what was surprising was that the Court, instead of
overruling the Pennsylvania Coal line of precedents, or treating it as the
New York Court of Appeals had as involving due process only and Justice Holmes' taking language as metaphorical, gave that line full weight
and found it wholly governing, down to directly quoting the Holmes
opinion as the "source." 231 The aphorism with all of its ambiguities and
cross-purposes would thus be enshrined as the law of the 1980s:
It is only logical, then, that government action other than acquisition
of title, occupancy, or physical invasion can be a 'taking,' and therefore a defacto exercise of the power of eminent domain, where the
effects completely deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in
the property.

232

What of Mugler, Miller, and Hadacheck? They are not mentioned.
Would they be overruled? I do not know. The question may be asked
because, while the Brennan opinion was only for a plurality of four, Justice Rehnquist in his concurrence made it clear that he in his words
"would have little difficulty in agreeing with much of what is said in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan. "233
Does it follow that full compensation had to be paid the San Diego
utility? The answer given by the Brennan plurality is affirmative, but
qualified in a judicial tour deforce by limiting the compensation to a time
period-- commencing on the date the regulation first effected the 'taking,' and ending on the date the government entity chooses to rescind or
otherwise amend the regulation." 234 Property "taken," then, can be
given back by amending the regulation; only interim damages, whatever
those are, may be awarded. Precedent for this novel approach is found in
cases where the government has taken only temporary use of an easement, building, land or equipment. 235 Full compensation is not required;
a regulatory taking may be rescinded with the measure of compensation
analogized to the rules of valuation already devised for formal temporary
exercises of the eminent domain power. Flexibility to government is written in because it may always choose formally to condemn or to pay full
230.
101 S. Ct. at 1301.
231. Id. at 1302. Justice Brennan viewed Justice Brandeis' position in dissent in Pennsvlhania
Coal as taking "the absolute position." Id. at 1303 n. 16.
232. Id. at 1304.

233.
234.

Id. at 1294.
Id. at 1304.

235. Id. at 1306-07 and cases cited. There is no indication that the San Diego open-space ordinance was temporary in nature except as it was made so by the Supreme Court decision.
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compensation. 236 The due process clause is relegated to operation where
there is no public purpose or public use and even then, of course, the
landowner may have an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a
237
due process violation.
Could the same result, even with the same damages, have been reached
under the due process clause? Does this approach show prescience by
expanding the just compensation clause in an era of expanding property
rights, even while limiting operation of the due process clause? The
unique doctrine advanced by Justice Brennan, 238 making police-power
takings compensable under the just compensation clause but on a temporary basis only, is proof positive that property rights law is in flux; the
sand has shifted even as I have written this paper over a period of six
months. It is not yet established Supreme Court law; it is, however, at the
cutting edge. My conclusions follow.
CONCLUSION
The contracts clause, the due process clause, and the just compensation
clause have each been applied from time to time to the problem of property rights in our Republic. The three clauses and the constitutional arguments made under them overlap and are often interchangeable. Relief
upon application of the clauses may differ, to be sure. Both the contracts
and due process clauses may invalidate laws that either regulate the exercise of those rights or transfer one or more of those rights to others (including the public at large); the just compensation clause on the other
hand goes one step further and makes the state, in effect, purchase rights
being regulated or transferred from the previous holder. Yet the damages
awarded may be the same.
All three constitutional clauses, however, ultimately address the same
analytic problem: When does the legislative act, which by definition has
the support of a majority of the representatives of the particular governmental body involved, constitute such a great degree of interference with
the property right or rights affected as to be unfair or unreasonable, or to
constitute a "taking" and be unjust, and to require, if the interference is
to be permitted, the payment of compensation, temporary or permanent,
by the government?
236. Id. at 1308.
237. Id. at 1306 n.23.
238. One commentator has recently discussed the question of remedies in "inverse condemnation" cases without suggesting that Justice Brennan's new-found doctrine did, or should, exist. Kanner, Inverse CondemnationRemedies in an Era of Uncertainty, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON
PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMNmrr DOMAIN (1980).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 56:583, 1981

The Supreme Court decisions under all three clauses have been inconsistent, going from time to time in entirely different directions. We are
now entering a fourth phase of property rights analysis. The contracts
clause has had its day in the sun; after a long period of darkness, it is
seeing light again. The due process clause, used substantively to support
laissez faire for one-half a century after 1890, was used not at all for the
next half; now it is used procedurally to protect selective property entitlements as one right of persons and, at times, used substantively to protect
other kinds of personal rights. We have seen the creation of a dilemma
not yet finally resolved by the Court and plaguing constitutional commentators to this very instant: If property rights are personal rights, as the
procedural cases say they are, why should they not have substantive protection like other personal rights? Or is substantive protection to be given
only to some personal rights and not others, or to none at all? If the latter,
who is to say which view is more subjectively based? Whose value system do we accept? Is that all there is to constitutional law?
We have seen the takings or just compensation clause used in an essentially ad hoc fashion over many decades. The clause has been hung up, as
it were, on the dilemma 39-a non sequitur-stemming from an oversimplification of the problem in the case law whether the governmental
regulation or transfer is a taking, in which case there must be full compensation, or is not, in which case there is no compensation. Instead,
consideration might be given to more flexible approaches that would look
at what compensation is just or fair so as to accommodate both the public
and personal interests involved-a sliding scale rather than what has been
a two-tier approach. But is a sliding-scale approach 240 any less subjective, or is it rather simply more descriptive? And, rather than follow the
commentators, a hefty body of Supreme Court Justices has recently taken
the view that the takings clause applies but permits the award of temporary just compensation; 24' while doing so it has left wholly in the air the
question of when there is a taking.
I have suggested that one inherent problem with respect to all three
clauses and their related but differing interpretations lies in an underlying
dualistic view of property as both personal and public, private and social-what I have called, respectively, the "dominion" and the "social"
239. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in City of San Diego notes Charles Haar's comment
that the attempt to differentiate "regulation" from "'taking" is "'the most haunting jurisprudential
problem in the field of contemporary land-use law ... one that may be the lawyer's equivalent of the
physicist's hunt for the quark." 101 S. Ct. at 1302 n. 15 (quoting C. HAAR. LAND-USE PLANNING 766

(3d ed. 1977)).
240. See generally Amsterdam. Perspectives on the Fifth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349.
376 (1974) (referring to the University of Pennsylvania Law School's "peachy-keen" grading scale).
241. See notes 224-237 and accompanying text supra.
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views of property. This dualistic perception of property rights has been
present prior to and throughout the history of the Republic. The other side
of the Janus-faced property-rights coin is governmental regulation or taking. Here I note that the role of government has not only varied from time
to time but varies depending on what government is involved, federal,
state, or local.
In the case of the Federal Government, we have seen a basic attitude of
"hands-off" property rights in the early days of the Republic slowly become, through exercises of the regulatory and taxing powers, somewhat
more forceful until the Great Depression ushered us into the era of a fullscale, big welfare-type government, only recently, perhaps, beginning to
be cut back. In the case of state governments, on the other hand, one or
more of the states has, at one time or another over the years, favored
debtors, mortgagees, farmers, consumers, laborers, women, or other
groups with interests antithetical to property rights, and run into judicial
intervention on the side of property. And many state and local governments have in the name of open space, property-value preservation, or
other laudable objects of support for the last fifty years or so regulated
property rights within their own borders with little regard to impact beyond those borders and very little restraint from without. It is, therefore,
not surprising that in the Supreme Court there have been varying responses to governmental action affecting property rights.
I do not mean to say that this varying response has depended solely on
what place property rights are given, or the role government takes, or the
value structure of any particular Justice or of the Justices on any particular
Supreme Court. That value structures play an important role is obviously
a truism. But the jurisprudential problem is a deeper one.
Property rights involve, as the Court has recently begun to put it, "investment expectations.' 242 If those expectations invariably include one
that government may act at will to regulate or restrict or transfer the property rights in question, plainly there is no limit to what government can
do, unless some interest other than "expectations" is being served. 243 At
least it will be only in the extreme case-one perhaps of very arbitrary,
very capricious, very selective governmental conduct-that the Court
will intervene in favor of the property-rights holder.
On the other hand if there is some other interest or there are some "expectations" that are protected in any event against governmental actionthat are beyond the reach of the government-that interest is, or those
expectations are, to be found, by definition, outside the framework of the
242.
243.

See notes 159 & 198 supra.
See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
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particular governmental action involved. And outside that framework is
some value judgment, some set of morals, some economic theory, that is,
if not a "higher" law, one sufficiently "high" as to be read into the Constitution itself as a part of the commands of that document or the system
of government it embodies and represents. The state has not given protection, by hypothesis, to the property rights in question; if they are to be
protected at all, therefore, it is only by the process of judicial review in
the courts by constitutional interpretation. And not to give them protection is, in the words of the cedar tree case, also to make a choice.
In the early days of the Nation the protection afforded property derived
from natural law, a higher law, as observed by Locke, as acknowledged
by Madison, and many others. 244 This higher law, simply stated, was that
Man had a right to some things that no one, not even the state, could take
from him; it was rationalized on the basis of either morals or utility. After
the Civil War and in reaction, as it were, to the agrarian movement culminating in Munn v. Illinois, the "Higher Law" became the doctrine of
laissez-faire, based on the principle of free trade being valuable as an end
in itself. When that principle, applied in an industrial society, did not
work well, or at all, property rights became second-class rights.
Today we see the justification for protection of property rights as having moral as well as utilitarian or economic grounds. The moral grounds
are John Stuart Mill's, that where one's labor has produced the property.
some or all of its benefits are deserved. The utilitarian grounds are that
acquisition and use of some things is necessary, to a reasonable degree.
for individual happiness and general welfare. 245 The economic grounds
remain Adam Smith's, as modified by the Chicago School: through
aggregation of resources, efficiency can be achieved, and production and
distribution of goods improved. 246 And, now quite properly I think, property rights can again be recognized as among other personal rights-we
may perceive a liberty element in their protection. 247 Put another way.
elimination of property right protection would result in, and where elimination has occurred, does result in, abridgement of an individual's liberty,
repression of his personality, deprivation of her "personhood. "248 This. I
suggest, is one of the very same ethical concepts that underlies the equal
244.
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protection clause, what Rawls has called an ethic of "mutual respect" 249
and "self-esteem.' '250 To use an argument that also justifies the equal
protection clause comes hard to those of us who have been brought up on
the double standard of footnote four of Carolene Products. But not to
acknowledge the validity of the argument for liberty as a justification for
protecting property rights is, I suggest, to suffer from tunnel vision. Unless one is a genuine Marxist who acknowledges no rights in the person at
all,25 1 one is forced to accept these propositions, I believe.
But of course each of these arguments for property rights protection has
its own limitations, and this is why we have courts and lawyers and, if I
am not irreverent, jurisprudential lectures. The moral dissent argument
does not justify protection where disproportionate harm or loss to others
is caused; the utility argument requires for protection a net social utility,
not merely a benefit for one if offset by detriment to others; and the liberty
argument requires that others' liberties are not abridged by the protections
involved.
There is a concern, overriding at times, that goes to the very security of
the system of government-or at least to the trust of people in it-and
that cuts entirely away from protection under the economic argument.
Property rights do come to be held disproportionately; if too few people
hold too many property rights, if too many people are socially and economically disadvantaged by too much protection of property rights, then,
as Jefferson observed in the France of 1785, the very state may be endangered, or life in it may become very fearsome. There is no doubt in my
mind that it was an implicit recognition of this last point by the Executive
(Franklin D. Roosevelt's political genius), the Court, and the public at
large that caused the forty-plus year decline of property rights protection
that I have spoken of so many times in this article. The Watts riots of the
1960's, the Brooklyn and Bronx of the mid-1970's blackout, and the
Miami of 1979 riot fame are reminders of the ultimate limitation on property rights protection.
Now, however, in the ebb and flow of human events, there are various
signs that we are approaching a new judicial era. I see nothing in the
political happenings, the mood of the country, the economic or philosophic makeup of judges and judicial appointing process, to indicate that
a new era will not be here sooner than we think. It may already be here. I
make no value judgment on this; I state it simply as a fact. We are but a
very short step from a new recognition of substantive due process in the
249.
250.
251.
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property rights field; it may offer flexibility, at least where governments
have limited financial resources, that the takings clause does not. Yet the
takings clause has suddenly come to the fore.
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also covers non-contractual obligations and thus has broader scope than
the contracts clause. Before condemning this out of hand, consider that it
may permit environmental, historical, and other protection to take place
without full compensation but with some form of compensation that is
fair; prominent thinkers have suggested this, though they have thought of
"fair compensation" or "the accommodation power" in term of "just
compensation" rather than substantive due process. The Supreme Court
has yet to take a determinative stand.
There is another possibility, of course, which is that the government
itself will keep its hands off property rights altogether and return us to the
nineteenth century era of laissez-faire. This would entail letting private
bargainers, as in the case of Houston, Texas, work out defacto zoning,
letting the principles of Adam Smith and Milton Friedman operate full
sway, giving us business not as usual but totally deregulated and unsubsidized. The danger, of course, is that to reduce by so much the role of
government will produce disparities which will become so great as to
cause another reaction. In that case, property rights may receive the same
degree of protection, or less, than they did from 1937 to 1977.
On what will happen I make no judgment. I only express the hope that,
on the part of the courts at least, and the Supreme Court in particular, it
will be done with value judgments identified, with analysis clarified, with
candid acknowledgment of inconsistency with precedents and avoidance
of the tyranny of labels, in short with all the finest tools of the judicial
trade.
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